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PERFORMANCE INDICATORS IN THE DUTCH 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE 
Nrco P. MOL* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1980s throughout the Western world, attempts have been made to 
introduce more decentralized types of management control in government 
bureaucracies. Decentralization of competences and responsibilities within 
government organizations should improve efficiency in the public sector - 
specifically in ‘core business’ activities, where access to the market 
mechanism or transfer to independent agencies is blocked. Generally, such a 
decentralization is considered to involve a substitution of performance 
controls for the input controls traditionally applied. Organization units 
might become ‘self-managing’ with respect to the utilization of their 
resources, when they could be made effectively responsible for the results 
obtained. 
In the Netherlands a reform labled contract management has been introduced 
into a large number of government organizations to realize this objective 
(Mol, 1989). Thereby targets for production are based upon explicit 
agreements between central management and decentral organization units. 
By mutual consent, then, those targets would constitute reliable benchmarks 
to judge performance on the basis of outcomes. 
Responsibility accounting should provide the techniques for performance 
measurement, required for the implementation of this contract management. 
Specifically, the development of indicator systems for the activities of 
organization units was expected to supply government with the instruments 
needed. Evaluation of efficiency in terms of input-output ratios calculated 
from these indicator systems should create an adequate substitute for the 
signals of the price mechanism elsewhere in use. 
The idea of contract management has triggered the development of 
indicator systems in many government organizations. Rarely, however, has 
this development reached the stage of full implementation. Indicator systems 
characterized by unambiguous definitions of the indicators applied, with 
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Definition 
(formula) 
precise target values specified and actual values regularly monitored and 
reported, can as yet be considered exceptional (cf. Sorber, 1993). 
In this paper one such an advanced indicator system will be examined. I t  
will be noted that the system - notwithstanding the scrupulous 
measurement of a large number of indicators - did not result in 
performance controls which could effectively replace the input controls 
actually used. The case study presented may thus draw attention to some 
additional conditions which those indicator systems should satisfy. 
Specifically, we will discuss the relevance of the individual indicators and the 
coherence of the indicator system as a whole with respect to the objective of 
performance evaluation. Thereby a model for the construction of coherent 
systems of relevant indicators will be developed and applied to the case 
examined. 
Requirements* 
OBJECT OF THE CASE SWDY 
The National Logistic Command (NLC), within the Department of Defence 
responsible for general logistic support and maintenance of material 
equipment on behalf of the Dutch land forces, will serve as the object of our 
inquiries. This organization is known to be well advanced in the application 
of responsibility accounting to its activities (as may generally be the case in 
this type of organization, cf. Euske and Lebas, 1994). 
Since 199 1 indicator systems have been measuring the performance of NLC 
and its subunits. These systems are contained in so-called TAPRO’s (‘task 
programs’), defining performance indicators and specifying (yearly) target 
values for these indicators. Periodically, actual values for the indicators are 
submitted in TAPRO evaluation reports (for a more extensive treatment of 
the ideas underlying the TAPRO system see Mol, 1995). 
In  the task programs, activities are clustered in so-called functional areas. 
Within these functional areas performance indicators are specified and target 
values are set, according to the format set out in Table 1. 
However, within NLC the question has been raised, does the system in fact 
provide any guidance to management control at all? Actual feedback of 
Table 1 
Functional I Performance Indicator I Target Value I Reporting 
7I 
Note: 
*E.g., for some indicators actual valua are reported every four weeks, for other indicators only 
incidentally. 
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TAPRO evaluations to decision making is being sensed as quite negligible. In  
particular, the intended contract management - to be built upon the task 
programs -has not yet materialized. Since the introduction of the TAPROs 
in 1991 virtually no reduction of input controls has been realized. Thus, we 
may ask which deficiencies in NLC’s management system might explain this 
disappointing outcome. 
In evaluating the performance controls applied in the TAPROs, it should 
first be admitted that external causes may be held partly responsible for this 
outcome. Notably, NLC has been subjected to rigorous reorganizations 
during the whole period of the TAPRO system’s existence. Nevertheless, a 
closer look at the TAPROs reveals some weaknesses in the indicator systems 
themselves, which may explain their limited value as a tool of management. 
Specifically two deficiencies of the TAPRO system will be discussed: (1) a 
lack of relevance of individual indicators, because of an emphasis on 
secondary rather than primary processes in performance measurement; and 
(2) a lack of coherence of the indicator system, because relations between the 
indicators are insufficiently determined. We will focus upon one unit of NLC, 
750 Maintenance Command (a regional unit for general maintenance), to 
provide more detail to the study. 
Relevance: Primary and Secondary Processes 
Performance indicators for organization units will refer, in principle, to the 
services which those units deliver. Problems of performance evaluation may 
sometimes necessitate measurement by proxies - based upon input or 
process rather than output characteristics of production - but need not 
deflect evaluation from the primary processes of production itself. 
However, a classification of the indicators for 750 Maintenance Command 
in areas belonging to primary processes (maintenance activities) and 
secondary ones (related to internal management of the unit) reveals that in 
the TAPRO system emphasis is in fact being given to the last category. In  
TAPROs for 1993 and 1994 respectively, the numbers can be counted as in 
Table 2. 
In the category of secondary processes we may encounter indicators like 
‘sick-leave’ and ‘vacancies’ and a variety of indicators related to documents 
to be prepared: budget proposals to be submitted in time, plans and reports 
with respect to training programs or the reduction of environmental impacts 
of production etc., including the preparation of next year’s TAPRO itself. 
Usually, these documents are just reported as available or not available (in 
time), as performance implied in their preparation cannot be measured 
otherwise. 
Such indicators do not, however, measure performance in services 
delivered. They may rather be characterized as monitoring devices with 
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Total Number of 
Indicators 
1993 60 
1994 49 
Table 2 
Indicators with Respect to: 
Primary Secondary 
Processes Processes 
20 40 
22 27 
respect to internal management, having as their main purpose to reduce the 
need for ‘ad hoc’ intervention by superiors. As such the indicator systems do 
not comply with the objectives of contract management purported a t  their 
development. 
Coherence: Indicator Sets and Indicator Systems 
Decision making can rarely be guided by values reported for single indicators 
without any reference to other variables related to them. Deviations of actual 
indicator values from targeted ones as such, do not give a clue to any action to 
be taken in response. They should be explained first by connecting them to 
other variations observed, to determine the direction in which adjustments 
would have to be made. 
In the indicator system developed for 750 MC, however, this coherence is 
found to be wanting. In the evaluation reports, values for the indicators are 
just being collected without any attempt to derive some general conclusion 
with respect to performance from them. Listings of projected and realized 
indicator values are only supplemented by detailed comments for individual 
indicators separately. Thus, the reports are presented in a line-item format as 
shown in Table 3. (Two indicators are added as examples.) 
This lack of coherence of the TAPRO indicator systems may also explain 
the very limited use of performance controls based on the evaluation reports 
so meticulously prepared. Obviously, the indicators in these reports are not 
connected to some underlying performance criterion from which some 
meaning for their variations might be derived. Deviations from the reported 
targets are intended to provide ‘signals’ for decision making, but without any 
clue as to what they are supposed to signalize, decisions cannot be based upon 
them. 
From these conclusions we turn to the question of how the additional 
conditions of ‘relevance’ and ‘coherence’ of indicator systems can be 
operationalized. We will try to find an answer to this question in a concept of 
value for money auditing to be developed in the next section. 
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Table 3 
75 
Performance 
Indicator 
Functional Area: Specific Maintenance Projects 
Projected Value Realized Value Comment 
21013 r Productive Labour Hours Less because of transfer of labour to other projects 23000 
Percentage of 
Projects Executed 
in Time 
190% 94% None 
Note: 
As the reports arc confidential, the figures presented are fictitious. 
VALUE-FOR-MONEY AUDITING 
In for-profit organizations indicator systems for performance evaluation are 
derived from the ultimate objective of profitability. The classic example is 
provided by the DuPont Chart, in which the single profit criterion is being 
expanded - possibly indefinitely - into logically connected indicators for 
variables affecting this ultimate criterion. 
We may consider then, iffor this auditing concept, a counterpart applicable 
to non-profit organizations (or 750 MC in particular) could be established. 
This question has been raised specifically in value-for-money auditing, 
‘value-for-money’ being the nonprofit alternative to the profit criterion in 
the for-profit sector. In the application of value-for-money auditing to the 
public sector a framework for indicator systems should be based ultimately 
upon a specification of social objectives pursued on the one hand (‘value’) 
and budgets allocated on the other (‘money’). So we may define value-for- 
money as the ratio ofsocial outcomes (effects) to budgets authorised for some 
purpose. In a formula: 
E (effect)/B (budget). 
In value-for-money auditing as developed in the 1980s, and promoted 
especially in the UK, this single ultimate performance criterion is dissected 
into three components: economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Metcalfe and 
Richards, 1990, pp. 28-30; and Carter, Klein and Day, 1992, pp. 35ff). 
However, substantial confusion remains over the precise meanings of these 
three concepts (in particular with respect to the concept of effectiveness, cf. 
e.g. Pollitt, 1986). In this paper the following definitions will be adopted: 
economy is the ratio of (physical) inputs used up to budgets spent I/B 
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efficiency is the ratio of outputs obtained to inputs used up 0/1 
effectiveness is the ratio ofeffects (impacts) realized to outputs obtained E/ 
0. 
The three components are logically related to each other and to the 
underlying value-for-money concept, because evidently 
E/B = I/B x 0/1 x E/O, 
(alternative definitions presented by e.g. McKinney, 1986, pp. 280-281, and 
Metcalfe and Richards, 1990, p. 29, fail to establish the required logical 
connections between the concepts involved). 
T o  construct indicator systems according to this framework relevant 
indicators have to represent 
with respect to the 
activities involved I 0 budgets allocated 0 inputs used up 0 outputs obtained effects realized 
To constitute a coherent system, any set of such indicators should fulfil two 
requirements for its application in value-for-money audits: 
1. Comhtency: all indicators should measure characteristics of an identical 
cluster of activities. E.g., an evaluation of ‘economy’ based upon a 
budget and input indicator will fail, if not all inputs used are accounted 
for in the budget (for instance in case of indirect costs) etc. 
Completeness: performance evaluations in terms of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness should contain indicators for all variables specified in the 
framework, as required for the calculation of the ratios by which these 
criteria have been defined. 
2, 
Indicator systems satisfying these requirements may produce definite 
judgements of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and their contribution to 
the overall value-for-money objectives. Thus they may constitute a tool of 
management which effectively directs attention at  deficiencies in 
performance and at  actions to be taken in view of them. 
Targets for the relevant (budget, input, output and effect) indicators are 
then derived from performance standards for economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. They are not immediately - and from the point of view of 
performance evaluation arbitrarily - set for those indicators themselves. 
Thus value-for-money auditing may proceed by comparing actual and 
projected values as depicted in Figure 1. 
The dual evaluation involved in these comparisons (dissection in 
components of projected and actual values) may be facilitated by a graphical 
representation of the model in which the four types of indicators are measured 
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effectiveness 
Effect 
value-for- 
Figure 1 
Value-for- Money Auditing Framework 
efficiency 
Input 
economy 
* Value-for-money b 
( p r o j e c t e d ) T  (projected) input T (projected) output T (project) effect 
budget 
economy efficiency effectiveness 
(actual) I, (actual) 1 (actual) output _L (actual) effect 
budget input 
along separate axes (adapted from Bouckaert, 1990 and 199 1, and Pedersen, 
1977). (See Figure 2.) 
Starting from some arbitrarily chosen point on the B-axis to represent the 
authorised budget, all other axes may be scaled according to standards set for 
the three performance criteria. Depicting standard economy as a 45 degree 
line in the fourth quadrant, the target value for inputs used up in spending 
that budget may be determined on the I-axis. Similarly, with standard 
efficiency as a 45 degree line in the first quadrant we derive a point on the 0- 
axis for the output matching this targeted input value. Again, from standard 
effectiveness a corresponding point on the E-axis may be derived. Thus we 
have the situation depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 
Setting Standards for Performance Criteria 
0 
All ratios set for the performance criteria are implied in a connection of 
indicator values represented in the model by a square. Performance 
evaluation may then proceed by comparing any rectangle depicting actual 
values in the model with this square. 
APPLICATION TO 750 MAINTENANCE COMMAND 
The application of the model to maintenance activities may be clarified by a 
(fictitious) numerical example. Let us suppose a budget of 850,000 has been 
authorised for inspection and repair of a certain type of equipment. For 
budget spending three performance standards have been specified: (labour) 
input may cost 850 an hour, on average two pieces of equipment should be 
handled in one hour and 98% of inspections and repairs should be successful. 
Let performance measurement then result in the following actual indicator 
values: budget spent 8 75,000, (labour) inputs used up 800 hours, outputs 
obtained 1,700 pieces handled, effects realized 1,670 pieces ready for use. 
This example may then be depicted as in Figure 4. 
Value-for-money may be considered insufficient in this case, to be attributed 
to the low I/B ratio in particular (only partially offset by favourable outcomes 
with respect to efficiency and effectiveness). Possibly, in this case input 
payments should be scrutinized, because higher prices paid for labour would 
not be accounted for by proportional increases in labour productivity. 
Obviously, such straightforward assessments will rarely be fully justified. 
Deficiencies in the validity or reliability of indicator measurements usually 
will call for more cautious applications of the model, in which alternative 
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Figure 4 
Performance Evaluation of Maintenance Activities 
Pieces handled 
79 
\ 
1,670 
Ready 
for use 
-.-.-. 
/. 
/ *  /. 
Budget 
interpretations ofmeasurement results will have to be taken into account (e.g., 
a relative decline in productive labour hours - the ‘job timelshop time’ ratio 
-may constitute an alternative explanation for the inadequate performance 
on the ‘economy’ criterion). However, the model presented may prove useful 
in such circumstances too, because it provides a simple visual frame of 
reference to ponder such alternative interpretations simultaneously. 
Upon this evaluation model the performance controls required for contract 
management with respect to 750 MC can be based. Applying the model to the 
TAPROs of this organization unit, we may thus consider to what extent a 
coherent system of relevant indicators could be derived from these task 
programs to generate those controls. 
An overview of available relevant indicators in the TAPROs should enable 
us to assess the deficiencies of 750 MC’s present indicator system. In those 
TAPROs, for eight types of maintenance activities two indicators are 
calculated: labour hours spent and percentages of projects delivered in time. 
Budgets are not allocated to the eight types of activities separately. In 750 
MC’s budgets, expenditure is classified by category of resources into 
‘personnel’ and ‘material’. Budgets are thereby restricted to controllable 
costs, implying especially with respect to personnel expenditure that only a 
fraction of full costs is being covered (numbers and salaries of employees are 
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fixed in NLC centrally). From this overview some major incompletenesses and 
inconsistencies of the indicator system may be evident. 
Incompleteness of the system: Budget information is only partially available, 
because costs cannot be allocated to the different types of maintenance 
activities on their own. As an  input indicator we have labour hours. Outputs 
and/or effects are indicated by one variable ‘percentage of projects delivered 
in time’ only. The interpretation of this indicator is not quite clear: on the one 
hand the ‘percentage’ of projects does not give a clue to the work load 
involved, and on the other hand, projects ‘delivered in time’ do not indicate 
if pieces ofequipment or vehicles delivered will be ready for their intended use 
by 750 MC’s customers. 
InconsistenGy of the system: The input and output indicators, both being 
related to the same maintenance programs, are fairly consistent. But the 
input indicator is not connected to 750 MC’s budget at all. Labour hours 
inputted refer to resources allocated to the organization unit by NLC 
centrally. Over 90% of the unit’s own budget is spent on material 
expenditure, which is not reflected in this input indicator. 
These incompletenesses and inconsistencies of 750 MC’s present indicator 
system obviously impede its application in Performance evaluation. 
Nevertheless, our assessment of these deficiencies suggests that relatively 
slight amendments and extensions of the indicator system may suffice to 
build at least some value-for-money audit upon it. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Indicator systems should fulfil the requirements of relevance and coherence to 
generate effective performance controls. For these requirements, speci- 
fications can be derived from value-for-money auditing. Applying a value- 
for-money auditing model to our case study, we have examined how these 
requirements may be given empirical content. 
However, relevance and coherence of the indicator system actually in use 
for the maintenance activities of the organization unit considered here have 
been found wanting - notwithstanding the substantial efforts spent in the 
development and application of this system. We may ask then, what 
conclusions can be drawn from this apparent failure to realize the potential 
for performance control which the indicator system contains. 
The traditional orientation ofmanagement control in military organizations 
at ‘command relationships’ may give us a clue in this assessment. Contrary to 
the idea of contract management formally endorsed in the Dutch land forces, 
management control thereby in fact remains focused- to some extent at least 
- on hierarchical subordination of commanding officers to their superiors. 
This orientation is reflected in the application of indicators which are 
irrelevant and incoherent from the point ofview ofperformance measurement. 
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Targets set for commanding officers may be only partially directed at  
performance of their organization units as such. Alternatively, those targets 
may be aimed a t  the enforcement ofsome compliance to central authority or 
regulations, and thereby focus on the way in which the units are managed 
internally (specifically in times of peace). Thus, indicators related to internal 
management will express a factual intention to apply input rather than 
performance controls. 
Hierarchical subordination implies, moreover, an emphasis on submission 
to given instructions. In such a setting target values for performance 
indicators may be viewed as orders rather than objectives. This conception of 
targets as orders to be obeyed may clarify the neglect ofcoherence in indicator 
systems. Accounting for deviations from these targets will refer to the 
indicators - orders - per se, not to any underlying performance criterion 
embedded in the indicator system. Management reports will thus focus on 
those deviances directly rather than on their explanation in relation to any 
criterion of economy, efficiency or effectiveness. 
Ultimately then, relevance and coherence of the indicator systems applied 
enable us to judge the extent to which a purported commitment to 
performance control (or contract management) in organizations is being 
given instrumental evidence. While performance controls may be officially 
acclaimed, managers in many organizations - civilian as well as military - 
in fact continue to favour input controls instead. Deficiencies in the indicator 
systems used may draw attention to this fact. 
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